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I. Introduction: Time to Take Stock
It is not clear at this point whether the requirement of fair and equitable treatment forms
part of customary law.' Nevertheless, in the words of Judge Higgins, "the key terms 'fair
and equitable treatment to nationals and companies' ... are legal terms of art well known
in the field of overseas investment protection ... "2 Indeed, in current litigation practice,
hardly any lawsuit based on an international investment treaty is filed these days without
invocation of the relevant treaty clause requiring fair and equitable treatment.
The almost ubiquitous presence of the clause in recent investment litigation finds its
explanation in various reasons. Nearly every claimant or counsel who brings a suit feels
tempted to argue that the treatment accorded by the host state was in violation of the
standard of fair and equitable treatment. At the least, the invocation is deemed necessary
by claimant's lawyers colorandi causa, to present a certain flair of an offense to basic notions
of justice to its cause. Also, the clause is in its substance closely related to the more specific
standards of an indirect expropriation, to a violation of the umbrella clause, or to the stan-
dard of national treatment. Whenever one of these standards stands in the foreground of
a suit, it appears at this point to be helpful to round out the case and to argue, on an
additional basis, in favor of a violation of fair and equitable treatment. Finally, the open-
ended language of clauses on fair and equitable treatment gives rise to speculation which
assumes that, if only properly argued, it will be possible to identify one or more aspects,
*Professor and Director, Institute of International Law, University of Bonn, Germany. The article is based
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1. See Patrick Juillard, Le volution des sources du droit des investissements, 250 RECUEIL DFS COURS 9, at 83, 132
(1994) (arguing that the standard must be considered a principle of general international law, albeit with a
minimum substance). But see ADF Group, Inc. v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/1, 18 ICSID
REv. 195, 279 (Jan. 9, 2003) (Feliciano, de Mestral, Lamm, Arbs.). "It may be that, in their current state, neither
concordant state practice nor judicial or arbitral caselaw provides convincing substantiation (or, for that matter
refutation) of the Investor's position." ADF has argued that current customary law embraces the requirement
of fair and equitable treatment. The issue is linked to the debate about the content of both the standard of fair
and equitable treatment and of the minimum standard. Id.
2. Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 1996 I.C.J. 803, 858 (Dec. 12) (separate opinion of Judge Higgins).
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individually or combined, which may amount to an act of violation. Indeed, a review of
some attempts at defining the standard may invite such thinking inasmuch as the approach
is so general in nature that the clause may appear to amount to a catch-all provision which
may embrace a very broad number of governmental acts.
It will hardly be doubted that efforts to derive juridically operational content of the
standard from short-hand definitions of fairness laid down in famous dictionaries will, in
view of the circular character of such definitions,' not lead very far. However, it does not
follow that recourse to the "ordinary meaning" of the term, as required under article 31 of
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,4 must necessarily become a futile effort.'
Lawyers and courts, national and international, have always been able to rely on abstract
terms and concepts laid down in laws and treaties, and to apply them to the facts presented
by the parties. It seems uncontroversial today that the standard is one determined by in-
ternational law. The existence of a breach of a domestic rule, or the lack of a breach, does
not in itself determine whether or not the standard has been violated.6 The issue is not so
clear with respect to the question of whether the breach of another article of an investment
treaty was violated or not.7
Of course, a degree of caution will be appropriate in the interpretation of the clause so
as to avoid implications of a subjective nature not intended by the authors of the clause.
Generally, reliance on previous jurisprudence will serve as a useful guide for those author-
ities which give content to the clause. The difficulty of tribunals constituted under the
auspices of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) and
other investment tribunals in this respect was simply that no previous body of jurisprudence
on the meaning of "fair and equitable" existed, neither for foreign investment law, nor for
general international law. However, between the year 2000, beginning with the Maffezini
decision," and 2004, with Waste Management 11,9 a first generation of judicial decisions has
been handed down, and it is useful at this point to take stock and to consider the emerging
lines and facts of jurisprudence.
3. For a survey see Stephen Vasciannie, The Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in Internationallnvestment
Law and Practice, 70 BYIL 100, 103 (1999) [hereinafter Vasciannie].
4. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 31, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 340.
5. See generally Hermann Mosler, General Principles of Law, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INT'L LAw, 511,
513 ((Rudolf Bernhardt, ed., 1995). For a judicial method to interpret the concept of equity, see North Sea
Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den.; F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.CJ. 3, 121 (Feb. 20).
6. See, e. g., ADF Group, 18 ICSID REv. at 195; Mondev Int'l Ltd. v. United States, ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/99/2 (Oct. 11, 2002), 42 I.L.M. 85, 106 (Stephen, Crawford, Schwebel, Arbs.).
7. See, S.D. Myers v. Canada (Nov. 12, 2000), 40 I.L.M. 1408, 1438, at para 266 (First Partial Award)
(Hunter, Chiasson, Schwartz, Arbs.).
Although (... ) the Tribunal does not rule out the possibility that there could be circumstances in which
a denial of the national treatment provisions of the NAFTA would not necessarily offend the minimum
standard provisions, a majority of the Tribunal determines that on the facts of this particular case the
breach of article 1102 essentially establishes a breach of article 1105 as well.
8. Maffezini v. Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7,16 ICSID Rav. 248 (Nov. 13, 2000) (Vicuna, Buergenthal,
Wolf, Arbs.).
9. Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/00/3 (Apr. 30, 2004), 43 I.L.M.
967 (2004) (Crawford, Civiletti, Gomez, Arbs.), available atwww.state.gov/documents/organization/34643.pdf.
VOL. 39, NO. 1
FAIR AND EQUITABLE TREATMENT 89
II. Origin of the Clause
The origin of the clause seems to date back to the treaty practice of the United States in
the period of Treaties on Friendship, Commerce and Navigation (FCN). ° For instance,
article I sec. 1 of the 1954 Treaty between Germany and the United States reads: "Each
Party shall at all times accord fair and equitable treatment to the nationals and companies
of the other Party and to their property, enterprises and other interests."" Subsequent
international model drafts for investment treaties have continued to rely on the clause. 2 As
is well-known, modem Bilateral Investment Treaties (BIT) are generally characterized by
language and rules which is much more specific and tailored to specific issues of foreign
investment, whereas FCN's addressed a much broader range of legal concerns. The fact
that BITs nevertheless retained the standard should not be seen as accidental against this
background. It appears that the authors of the BITs considered that it was desirable to
include a general standard, in addition to the specific rules, which would cover such issues
and matters relevant for the desirable extent of protection which did not fall under the
specific rules.1
10. See ROBERT R. WILSON, UNITED STATES COMMERCIAL TREATIES AND INTERNATIONAL LAw 113, 2 (1960).
See also Vasciannie, supra note 3 at 107.
11. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Oct. 29, 1954, U.S.-ER.G., 273 U.N.T.S. 4. See also
Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights, Aug. 15, 1955, U.S.-Iran, 284 U.N.T.S. 110, 114.
12. See, e.g., Hermann Abs & Lord Shawcross, The Proposed Convention to Protect Private Foreign Investment,
A Round Table: Comment on the Draft Convention by its Authors, 9 J. oF PuB. L. 119 (1960) [hereinafter Abs &
Shawcross]. As early as 1948, the Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization called, in article
11(2)(a)(i), for bilateral and multilateral agreements on measures designed "to assure just and equitable treat-
ment for the enterprise, skills, capital, arts and technology brought from one Member country to another." See
U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEVELOPMENT, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS: A COMPENDIUM 4
(MULTILATERAL INSTRUMENTS), UNCTAD/DTCI/30 (Vol. 1), U.N. Sales No. E.96.I1A.9 (1996) [hereinafter
Compendium Vol. I]. In the 1960's, early German and Swiss Bilateral Investment Treaties also relied on the
clause, initially on the context of the rules on the transfer of payments (see BIT Germany-Malaysia, Dec. 12,
1960, BGB1. 1962, 1064), but starting in 1962 as a general principle of treatment (see, e.g., BIT Germany-
Cameroon, June 29, 1962, BGBI. 1963, 991), and Switzerland-Ivory Coast,June 26, 1962, Official Collection
(Amtliche Sammlung) 1963, 54. Not surprisingly, the 1967 OECD Draft Convention introduced, in article 1,
the precise language as the Abs-Shawcross Convention (U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEVELOPMENT, IN-
TERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS: A COMPENDIUM 113 (REGIONAL INSTRUMENTS), UNCTAD/DTCI/30
(Vol. II), U.N. Sales No. E.96.IH.A. 10 (1996) [hereinafter Compendium Vol. II. The OECD Draft negotiating
Text for a Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) of 1998 contained the following text in its section on
investment protection: "1.1 Each Contracting Party shall accord to investments in its territory of investors of
another Contracting Party fair and equitable treatment and full and constant protection and security. In no
case shall a Contracting Party accord treatment less favourable than that required by international law." U.N.
CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEVELOPMENT, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS: A COMPENDIUM 148
(MULTILATERAL & REGIONAL INSTRUMENTS), UNCTAD/DITE/2 (Vol. IV), U.N. Sales No. E.00.1I.D.13 (2000)
[hereinafter Compendium Vol. IV].
13. Documents prepared on the multilateral level in the 1970s and 1980s by the developing countries, or
under their dominant influence, contained no reference to the standards. See Charter of Economic Rights and
Duties of States, G.A. 3281, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess. At 50 (1974);, Asian-African Legal Consultative Com-
mittee Revised Draft of Model Agreements for Promotion and Protection of Investments, reprinted in U.N.
CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV., INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS: A COMPENDIUM 115 (REGIONAL
INTEGRATION, BILATERAL AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL INSTRUMENTS), UNCTAD/DTCI/30 (Vol. 111) (1996)
[hereinafter Compendium Vol. III]. The subsequent change in the position of developing states becomes ob-
vious in their bilateral treaty practice containing the standard and, even more, in the adoption of the standard
in the 1994 Protocol on Promotion and Protection of Investments coming from States not Parties to
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I. The Nature and Function of A Fair and Equitable
Treatment Clause: Basic Issues
In its diverse manifestations, the standard of fair and equitable treatment may address
manifold types of governmental actions inherently investment-deterring which more spe-
cific rules are unsuitable to address. While this is true in principle for all clauses on fair
and equitable treatment, generalizations about the standard must be formulated with cau-
tion. As with most other standard clauses in investment treaties, no single frozen version
exists. Indeed, the variations in this area have been considered to be quite significant, 4 and
every type of clause has to be interpreted, in accordance with article 31 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, duly taking into account its context, and as appropriate,
its history. Some treaties simply prescribe "fair and equitable treatment"; German, Dutch,
Swedish and Swiss BITs generally follow this pattern. Others consider the standard as one
element of the general rules of international law. France, the United Kingdom, the United
States, and, more recently, Canada have followed this approach. Also, article 1105 of
NAFTA reads "[e]ach Party shall accord to investments of investors of another Party treat-
ment in accordance with international law, including fair and equitable treatment and full
protection and security." 1" A third version lists fair and equitable treatment side by side
with the rules of international law, and some treaties state that fair and equitable treatment
must in no case provide for less protection than the rules of international law.
Essentially, the purpose of the clause as used in BIT practice is to fill gaps which may be
left by the more specific standards, in order to obtain the level of investor protection in-
tended by the treaties. 16 Some treaties even directly tie the clause to the fundamental goal
of legal stability. The US-Argentina BIT of 1991, for instance, provides in the preamble
that "fair and equitable treatment of investment is desirable in order to maintain a stable
framework." 7
MERCOSUR, reprinted in Compendium Vol. II, supra note 12 at 527. During earlier decades, the insistence
on the Calvo tradition in South America would have stood in the way of such an approach. In between, a 1988
Draft Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations still seemed to indicate a certain reluctance on the part
of developing countries to accept exactly the same language, and the requirement of "fair" treatment had to
be placed in brackets. Compendium Vol. 1, supra note 12 at 712.
14. See RUDOLF DOLZER & MARGRETE STEVENS, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 58 (1995); Giorgio Sac-
erdoti, Bilateral Treaties and Multilateral Instruments on Investment Protection, 269 RECUEIL DES CouRs 251, 344
(1997).
15. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 8-17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 605, 639 (entered into force Jan.
1, 1994).
16. See alsojuillard, supra note I at 133:"... force est de constater que l'imprcision qui affecte des notions
telles que le traitement juste et equitable, ou encore la pleine et enti~re protection et scurit6, ne fait que mettre
en lumire l'incapacit6 oO se sont trouv6s les Etats i donner un contenu I ces principes."
17. Treaty with Argentina Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of investment, Nov.
14, 1991, 1991 U.S.T. LEXIS 176, at *11 (entered into force Oct. 20, 1994). Concerning the foundations and
nature of the standard of fair and equitable treatment outside of NAFTA, the U.S. State Department has
explained its position in 1992 in terms of the standard as a guide to interpretation, as embodying U.S. policy
and as replicating European practice and in 2000 as being based on standards found in customary international
law. SeeJackJ. Coe, Fair and Equitable Treatment under NAFTA's Investment Chapter, AM. SOcIETY OF INT'L LAw
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 96TH ANNUAL MTO., 17-19 (Mar. 13-16, 2002). The U.S. Model Treaty of 2004 prescribes,
in art. 5, para. 1, that each party "shall accord to covered investments treatment in accordance with customary
international law, including fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security," adding in para. 21
that this rule "prescribes the customary international law minimum standard of treatment of aliens as the
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The systematic location and operation of the clauses in existing investment treaties is
reminiscent of general codes in civil law countries which set forth a number of specific rules
and complement these with a general clause of good faith as an overarching principle which
fills gaps and informs the understanding of specific clauses. Indeed, the substance of the
standard of fair and equitable treatment will in large part overlap with the meaning of a
good faith clause in its broader setting," with one significant aspect embracing the related
notions of venire contra factum proprium and estoppel.'9
One aspect which also deserves attention concerns the question of whether the standard
actually contains two standards, namely "fair" and "equitable," with independent meanings
of both concepts. While it would not be impossible to argue this way, no evidence of state
practice seems to point in this direction. The general assumption so far is, presumably, that
"fair and equitable" must be considered to represent a single, unified standard. Indeed, it
has been opined that there is no difference between "equitable" and "fair and equitable." °
In theory, it would have been possible to understand the requirement of fair and equitable
treatment as a short-hand formula for the combined legal effect of all other standards of
treatment contained in an investment treaty. For instance, the World Bank Guidelines of
1992 prescribe that each state will extend to investments "fair and equitable treatment
according to the standards recommended in [the] Guidelines." 2' The languages of BITs are
not based on this pattern, and judicial practice has not reflected such a view of the standard.22
A thorny issue in the understanding and the definition of the standard concerns its re-
lationship with other standards and concepts which are contained in BITs or are otherwise
deemed relevant for the regime of foreign investment. The generality of the clause easily
lends itself to an expansive view of its reach extending to all corners and aspects of an
investment setting. At the same time, it is obvious that the clause is not meant to supplant
or replace all other segments of an investment treaty.
Thus, an understanding must be developed which both gives meaningful effect to the
clause and at the same time respects the independent existence of other standards and
concepts. 23
minimum standard of treatment to be afforded to covered investments," and that the concept of fair and
equitable treatment does not require additional protection and does not create additional substantive rights.
To further clarify the scope of art. 5, Annex A defines customary law ("general and consistent practice of States
that they follow from a sense of legal obligation"), and also describes the minimum standard to treatment of
aliens ("all customary international law principles that protect the economic rights and interests of aliens").
2004 U.S. Model BIT, available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade-Sectors/Investment/Model-BIT/asset
upload-file847_6897.pdf.
18. See generally Anthony D'Amato, Good Faith, in 12 ENCvCLOPEDtI OF PUB. INT'L LAW 599 (Rudolf Bem-
hardt, ed., 1995).
19. Jorg Paul Miiller & Thomas Cottier, Estoppel, in 2 ENCvCLOPEDIA OF PUB. INT'L LAW 116 (Rudolf Bern-
hardt, ed., 1995).
20. See MARIAN NASH LEICH, 2 CUMULATWVE DIGEST OF U.S. PRACTICE IN INT'L LAW 1981-1988, at 2652
(U.S. Dep't of State Office of the Legal Adviser, 1993).
21. See Compendium Vol. 1, supra note 12 at 247, 248.
22. A Working Paper of the WTO states rather broadly that the standard is considered "to cover the
principle of non-discrimination, along with other legal principles related to the treatment of foreign investors,
but in a more abstract sense than the standards of MFN and national treatment." VTO Secretariat, Non-
Discrimination Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment and National Treatment, VT/WGTI/W/1 18 at 10 (June 4,
2002).
23. One Tribunal considered that the same acts (seizure and auction of an investment) violated the require-
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In this context, a key issue concerns the relationship to such standards which are not, or
not explicitly, mentioned themselves in investment treaties. The matter has already come
to the forefront of litigation and of judgments in deciding whether the notion of transpar-
ency is embodied in the standard of fair and equitable treatment. This matter derives its
difficulty on the one hand from the conceptual affinity between the two standards ("Can a
non-transparent decision be deemed fair and equitable"?) and, on the other hand, the ex-
istence of an extensive, independent international debate about not just the necessity but
also the extent of transparency as an element of an appropriate investment regime. The
Supreme Court of British Columbia in Canada in 2001 considered as invalid that part of
the Metalciad decision in which the latter assumed that transparency was to serve as a stan-
dard by which a NAFTA party should be judged even though the regime on transparency
was addressed in a separate part of NAFTA not subject to review by a NAFTA Tribunal.1
4
Nevertheless, subsequent tribunals have revisited the point, without discussion of Metalciad,
and have confirmed that the standard of fair and equitable treatment embodies the require-
ment of transparency."
Much more attention has been paid to the relationship between the standard of fair and
equitable treatment and the concept of a minimum standard which denotes those rules of
general international law which a state must always observe in its relations towards aliens.
26
While it may be argued that a relationship between the two concepts is not self-evident,
the issue has come up because the language of some BITs spell out that the concepts have
the same meaning ("fair and equitable in accordance with international law"), and the State
parties to NAFTA have strictly insisted, in response to judicial rulings to the contrary, that
within the NAFTA regime ("treatment in accordance with international law, including fair
and equitable treatment"), the two standards must be interpreted so as to have identical
content." This position, however, does not answer the question of the relationship outside
of NAFTA,2s because third states are not bound to the NAFTA standard.
ments both of fair and equitable treatment and of the duty to compensate in case of a measure tantamount to
expropriation. See Middle East Cement Shipping & Handling Co. S.A. v. Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/99/6,
18 ICSID REv. 602 (Apr. 12, 2002) (Btckstiegel, Bemardini, Wallace, Arbs.).
24. "In the present case, however, the Tribunal did not simply interpret the wording of article 1105. Rather,
it misstated the applicable law to include transparency obligations and it then made its decision on the basis of
the concept of transparency." United Mexican States v. Metalclad Corp., 119 I.L.R. 646, 665, at para. 70 (S. Ct.
of B.C. 2001) (Can.).
25. See Maffezini v. Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, 16 ICSID REv. 248, 274 at para. 83 (Nov. 13, 2000)
(Vicuna, Buergenthal, Wolf, Arbs.); Tecnicas Medioambientales TECMED S.A. v. United Mexican States,
ICSID Case ARB (AF)/00/2 (May 29, 2003), 43 ILM 133 at paras. 154, 164 (2004); Occidental Exploration
and Production Company (OEPC) v. Ecuador, Case No. UN 3467, at para. 185, (London Ct. Int'l Arb. July
1, 2004), available at www.asil.org/ilib/OEPC-Ecuador.pdf; Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. United Mexican States, ICSID
Case No. ARB (AF)/00/3 (Apr. 30, 2004), 43 I.L.M. 967 (2004), at para. 98 (Crawford, Civiletti, Gomez, Arbs.),
available at www.state.gov/documents/organization/
3 4 64 3
.pdf.
26. See D. Vagts, Minimum Standard, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 408 (Rudolf Bern-
hardt, ed, 1997).
27. ADF Group, Inc. v. United States, 18 ICSID Rev. 195, 228, 276 (Jan. 9, 2003) (Feliciano, de Mestral,
Lamm, Arbs.), Remarkably, the UNCTAD Secretariat has questioned whether the standards are identical. See
U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEVELOPMENT, FAIR AND EQUITABLE TREATMENT 15, UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/1 1
(Vol. III), U.N. Sales No. E.99.II.D.15 (1999).
28. See also, Commentary to the 1967 OECD Draft: "standard required conforms in effect to the "minimum
standard" which forms part of customary international law." Abs & Shawcross, supra note 12. But see OECD,
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS RELATING TO INVESTMENT IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (1984).
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If it is determined, in the light of the specific language of a BIT or otherwise, that the
position is the same as for NAFTA, two further issues will have to be addressed before the
standard can be given a judicially manageable meaning. Initially, it will have to be recog-
nized that the minimum standard has been described, in abstract but distinct terms, by a
ruling of a US-Mexican Commission in 1927 in the Neer case29 which indeed was based on
the view that a "minimum standard" will only provide for minimal obligations of the host
state and in this sense only provide for minimal protection of the alien. The issue in the
context of a contemporary investment treaty is whether the Neer ruling on the minimum
standard, dealing with the physical security of an alien before 1945, should govern when it
comes to the contemporary regime of international law governing foreign investment, be
it in the context of customary law or within a treaty. In case it is concluded that a pre-1945
general standard is applicable in principle, the next question would be whether and under
which modalities such a standard would have to be applied in an evolutionary manner,30 in
the light of intermediary and contemporary factors.31
A recent tendency may be observed to consider the standard as embracing the notions
of due process and denial of justice.32 The 2004 US-Model BIT prescribes: "[The] obli-
gation to provide 'fair and equitable treatment' includes the obligation not to deny justice
in criminal, civil or administrative proceedings in accordance with the principle of due
process embodied in the principal legal systems of the world.""3 Presumably, under this
view, the standard of fair and equitable treatment incorporates the traditional standard of
denial of justice. Practically, the issue is relevant for the interpretation of a freestanding
clause on fair and equitable treatment. The International Court of Justice did not address
the standard of fair and equitable treatment in ELSI v. Italy,34 nor did it do so in the Asylum
case.
3
" Both cases concerned the standard of arbitrariness.
A central methodological issue for the resolution of these individual questions concerns
the process of reasoning by which fact-specific conclusions are drawn from the standard in
individual cases. One line of reasoning derives a definition from the essential elements of
the standard on the basis of abstract reasoning. A second approach resists an attempt of a
broader definition and will decide ad hoc whether a certain conduct satisfies the require-
ments of the standard. Yet a third approach will attempt to primarily base its decision on
29. L. E H. Neer & Pauline Neer v. United Mexican States, 4 REP. OF INT'L ARB. AwARDs 60 (1926); AM.
J. OF INT-r. L 555 (1926). The case addressed a complaint of a widow who considered that the Mexican authorities
had failed to properly prosecute the killers of her husband. The oft-repeated passage reads: "IThe treatment
of an alien, in order to constitute an international delinquency, should amount to an outrage, to bad faith, to
wilful neglect of duty, or to an insufficiency of governmental action so far short of international standards that
every reasonable and impartial man would readily recognize its insufficiency." Neer, at 61-62.
30. For a dynamic-evolutionary interpretation of the concept of "sacred trust," as laid down in 1919, see,
e.g., Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (S.W Africa)
Nothwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276, 1971 I.C.J. 16 (June 21).
31. See Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/00/3 (Apr. 30, 2004), 43
I.L.M. 967 (2004) (Crawford, Civiletti, Gomez, Arbs.), available at www.state.gov/documents/organization/
34643.pdf; Mondev Int'l Ltd. v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2 (Oct. 11, 2002), 42 I.L.M. 85,
85 (Stephen, Crawford, Schwebel, Arbs.); ADF Group, Inc., 18 ICSID Rtv. at 228.
32. Waste Mgmt., Inc., 43 I.L.M. 967.
33. For the text see http://www.ustr.gov/assets/frade-Sectors/Investment/Mode-BIT/asset-upload-file847-
6897.pdf.
34. Elettronica Sicula S.P.A. (ELSI v. Italy), 1989 I.CJ. 15.
35. 1950 I.CJ. 284 (Nov. 20, 1950).
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previous decisions or will build upon relevant precedents by way of analogy or by drawing
on the same principle. Obviously, the latter approach was not available to the first tribunals
to apply the standard.
IV. Fair and Equitable Treatment: Case Law 2000-2004
A. BIT JURISPRUDENCE
An early ICSID case in which the standard was at least arguably applied, was AMT v.
Zaire36 concerning the Treaty between the United States and Zaire. The treaty linked
together "fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security." After incidents of
looting, the Tribunal determined that the host state had "manifestly failed to respect the
minimum standard required of it by international law."37 Under classical doctrine, such a
case would have been treated in terms of the minimum standard on the level of general
international law.3"
In Maffezini v. Spain, dated November 13, 2000,39 the Tribunal in one sentence linked
the standard to requirements of transparency and concluded that the organization of a loan
transaction at the expense of the account of the claimant without proper knowledge of the
claimant amounted to a violation of the standard. 4° The notion of good faith would have
supported the same conclusion.
Genin v. Estonia, dated June 25, 2001,41 had to apply a BIT which provides for fair and
equitable treatment and additionally prescribes that no investment shall be accorded treat-
ment less favorable than that required by international law. Essentially, the Genin Tribunal
relied on language similar to the Neer decision in its understanding of the clause "acts
showing a wilful neglect of duty, an insufficiency of action falling far below international
standards, or even subjective bad faith, '' 42 and rejected the claim that certain actions by
Estonia amounted to a violation of the standard.
An atmosphere of a jurisprudential crisis surrounded the clause in September 2001, when
two tribunals reached different conclusions in the application of two free standing clauses
to the same facts.
43
On the legal side, the Lauder Tribunal (Briner, Cutler, Klein) concluded that the standard
"is related to the traditional standard of due diligence" and provides a minimum standard
36. Am. Mfg. & Trading, Inc. v. Republic ofZaire, ICSID Case No. ARB/93/1 (Feb. 21, 1997), 36 I.L.M.
1531 (1997) (Sucharitkul, Golsong, Mbaye).
37. Id. at para. 6.10.
38. See also EDWIN M. BORCHARD, DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION OF CITIZENS ABROAD (1919).
39. Maffezini v. Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, 16 ICSID REv. 248 (Nov. 13, 2000), (Vicuna, Buergen-
thal, Wolf, Arbs.).
40. Id. at para. 83: "Moreover, the lack of transparency with which this loan transaction was conducted is
incompatible with Spain's comnitment to ensure the investor a fair and equitable treatment in accordance with
article 4(1) of the same treaty."
41. Genin v. Estonia, ICSID Case No. ARB/99/2, 17 ICSID REv. 395, at para. 367 (June 25, 2001) (Fortier,
Heth, van den Berg, Arbs.).
42. Id.
43. These cases refer to BITs between the United States and Czechoslovakia, and Netherlands and Czecho-
slovakia. See Lauder v. Czech Republic, Sept. 3, 2001, (Final Award), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/
LauderAward.pdf (last visited Apr. 5, 2005); CME v. Czech Republic, Case T 873 5-01 (Svea Ct. App., Sept.
13, 2001) (Swe.), available at www.sccinstitute.com/-upload/shared-files/artiklar/toeckiska-republiken.pdf.
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forming part of customary law also embracing a prohibition of non-discrimination.- The
CME Tribunal (Kiihn, Schwebel, Hindl) highlighted the significance of the fair and eq-
uitable treatment standard: "The obligation of fair and equitable treatment is a specific
provision commonly at the heart of investment treaties that may prohibit actions-includ-




On the facts, the Lauder Tribunal found no inconsistent conduct of the Czech Republic,
whereas the CME Tribunal concluded that the Czech authority "breached its obligation of
fair and equitable treatment by evisceration of the arrangements in reliance upon which
the foreign investor was induced to invest.""
Tecnicas Medioambientales TECMED S.A. v. United Mexican States was decided on May 29,
2003.41 The relevant BIT between Spain and Mexico provided for "fair and equitable Treat-
ment, according to International Law .... ,,4
Initially, the Tribunal (Grigera Naon, Fernandez Rozas, Bernal Verea) explains that this
standard is an expression of the bona fide principle recognized in international law and
quotes the passage in Mondev in which it is said that "[t]o the modern eye, what is unfair
and inequitable need not equate with the outrageous or the egregious," 49 apparently dis-
tancing itself from the Neer formula.
What follows, by way of setting forth a practical standard of review, is the most extensive
explanation of the foundations and the substance of the standard of which the initial key
passage reads:
154. The Arbitral Tribunal considers that this provision of the Agreement, in light of the good
faith principle established by international law, requires the Contracting Parties to provide to
international investments treatment that does not affect the basic expectations that were taken
into account by the foreign investor to make the investment. The foreign investor expects the
host State to act in a consistent manner, free from ambiguity and totally transparently in its
relations with the foreign investor, so that it may know beforehand any and all rules and
regulations that will govern its investments, as well as the goals of the relevant policies and
administrative practices or directives, to be able to plan its investment and comply with such
regulations. Any and all State actions conforming to such criteria should relate not only to the
guidelines, directives or requirements issued, or the resolutions approved there under, but also
to the goals underlying such regulations. The foreign investor also expects the host State to
act consistently, i.e. without arbitrarily revoking any pre-existing decisions or permits issued
by the State that were relied upon by the investor to assume its commitments as well as to
plan and launch its commercial and business activities.5 0
The Tribunal emphasizes its position that this standard results from an autonomous
interpretation of the standard, referring to the ordinary meaning as addressed in article 31
44. Lauder v. Czech Republic, Sept. 3, 2001, (Final Award), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/
LauderAward.pdf (last visited Apr. 5, 2005).
45. CME v. Czech Republic, Case T 8735-01, at para. 155 (Svea Ct. App., Sept. 13, 2001) (Swe.),available
at www.sccinstitute.com/-upload/shared-files/artiklar/toecdska-republiken.pdf.
46. Id. at para. 611.
47. Tecnicas Medioambientales TECMED S.A. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case ARB (AF)/00/2 (May
29, 2003), 43 ILM 133 (2004).
48. Id.
49. Id, at paras. 153-54 (citing Mondev Int'l Ltd. v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2 (Oct.
11, 2002), 42 I.L.M. 85, at para. 116).
50. TECMED, 43 ILM 133, at para. 154.
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of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, or from international law and the good
faith principle.5 The method of interpretation relies on the Tribunal's understanding of
the ordinary meaning of "fair and equitable" and does not refer to state practice or arbitral
and judicial decisions. The Tribunal adds that a different conclusion would fail to give effect
to the intentions of the parties which are also reflected in the Preamble of the Treaty to
intensify economic relation and the resolve to create favourable conditions for invest-
ments. 2 Drawing on its earlier insistence that legal instruments in place have to be used
"in conformity with the function usually assigned to such instruments,"" the Tribunal em-
phasizes its position that the laws applicable to the investment would be used to promote
the goals underlying such laws.
On the facts, the Tribunal found that the conduct of Mexico in question regarding a
permit for a landfill Operations was characterised by a lack of transparency, by a closing of
the landfill "in spite of the expectations created" by an ambiguity of various actions, and
that the conduct was motivated by political reasons.54 As a result, the Tribunal found that
Mexico's behaviour "conflicts with what a reasonable and unbiased observer would consider
fair and equitable...51
This survey does not consider MTD Equity Sdn. Bhd. and MTD Chile S.A. v. Chile, dated
May 25, 2004.56 The case is currently subject to an annulment proceeding.
OEPC v. Ecuador, dated July 1, 2004 (Orrego Vicufia, Brower, Sweeney), is remarkable
for directly tying a fair and equitable treatment clause of a BIT, worded as a free-standing
requirement, to the particular language of the preamble: ".... fair and equitable treatment
is desirable in order to maintain a stable framework for investment and maximum utilization
of economic resources ...."' Reading the standard in conjunction with this part of the
preamble, the Tribunal directly concludes: "The stability of the legal and business frame-
work is thus an essential element of fair and equitable treatment."
58
On the facts, the Tribunal concludes that the law in Ecuador was altered, after the claim-
ant had invested "in an important manner" and that the relevant "tax law was changed
without providing any clarity about its meaning and extent and the practice and regulations
were also inconsistent with such changes."59
The Tribunal subsequently returns to the "need for this stability" as emphasized by various
other Tribunals, citing to the famous language of Metalclad requiring "a transparent and
predictable framework" and an "orderly process and timely disposition in relation to an in-
vestor of a Party acting in the expectation that it would be treated fairly and justly...."60
OEPC adds a citation to the TECMED language, concluding that the requirements of fair
and equitable treatment had not been met by Ecuador.
6
'
51. Id. at para. 155.
52. Id. at para. 156.
53. Id. at para. 154.
54. Id. at para. 164.
55. Id. at para. 166.
56. MTD Equity Sdn. Bhd. v. Republic of Chile, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/7 (May 25, 2004) (Sureda,
Lalonde, Oreamuno Blanco, Arbs.), available at www.asil.org/ilib/MTDvChile.pdf (last visited Apr. 5, 2005).
57. Occidental Exploration and Production Company (OEPC) v. Ecuador, Case No. UN 3467, at para. 185,
(London Ct. Int'l Arb. July 1, 2004), available at www.asil.org/ilib/OEPC-Ecuador.pdf.
58. Id. at para. 183.
59. Id. at para. 184.
60. Id. at para. 185.
61. Id. at para. 187.
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In an interesting manner, the Tribunal thereafter decides to turn to the distinction, or
possible distinction, of different versions of the standard. The relevant clause before the
Tribunal in the applicable Treaty between Ecuador and the United States reads: "Invest-
ment shall at all times be accorded fair and equitable treatment, shall enjoy full protection
and security and shall in no case be accorded treatment less favourable than that required
by international law." 61
From this language the Tribunal concludes: "This means that a minimum fair and eq-
uitable treatment must be equated with the treatment required under international law,"63
and then raises the issue "... whether the fair and equitable treatment mandated by the
Treaty is a more demanding standard than that prescribed by customary international law."-
The cryptic answer given by the Tribunal seems to suggest that the two standards will be
different in principle even though the Tribunal finds that they are identical in regard to
requirements in the specific situation before the Tribunal: "[t]he Tribunal is of the opinion
that in the instant case the Treaty standard is not different from that required under inter-
national law concerning both the stability and predictability of the legal and business frame-
work of the investment." 65
B. NAFTAJURISPRUDENCE
In its ruling of August 30, 2000, the Metaklad Tribunal directly tied the principle of
transparency to the standard of fair and equitable treatment.- The relevant conclusion
reads: "Mexico failed to ensure a transparent and predictable framework for Metaldad's
business planning and investment. The totality of these circumstances demonstrates a lack
of orderly process and timely disposition in relation to an investor of a Party acting in the
expectation that it would be treated fairly and justly in accordance with the NAFTA."67
The Supreme Court of British Columbia ruled on a challenge of the award and concluded
that the Tribunal went, in this respect, beyond its mandate which was limited by chapter
XI of NAFTA. Inasmuch as the principle of transparency is set forth outside of that chapter,
in § 102, the Court decided that the ruling was invalid on this point.68
In Pope & Talbot, decided on May 31, 2002, the Tribunal ruled that Canada's actions fell
below the standard of Neer because it would "shock and outrage every reasonable citizen
in Canada," and that it was not necessary, therefore, to decide whether a more demanding
standard was required.6' The Tribunal found that the investor had been harassed in various
ways by Canada, with threats of reduction of export quotas and unjustified suggestions of
criminal investigations.
62. Id.
63. Id. at para. 188.
64. Id. at para. 189.
65. Id. at 190.
66. Metalclad Corp. v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1, at paras. 74-101 (Aug. 20, 2000) (Lauter-
pacht, Civiletti, Siqueiros, Arbs,).
67. Id. at para. 99.
68. United Mexican States v. Metalclad Corp., [2001] B.C.T.C. 664, 2001 B.C.TC. LEXIS 393 (May 2,
2001) (Can.), at para. 72.
69. Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Canada, (May 31, 2002) 41 I.L.M. 1347, at paras. 68, 69 (Dervaird, Greenberg,
Belman, Arbs.).
SPRING 2005
98 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
In its decision of October 11, 2002, the Mondev Tribunal was not faced with the question
of the general meaning of a free standing clause on fair and equitable treatment.7° As ac-
cepted and explained by the Tribunal, the NAFTA Treaty had been interpreted by the
NAFTA parties, in an authoritative interpretative note, that the standard was to be under-
stood as a minimum standard in accordance with customary law, not as a self-standing
concept. However, in the proceedings all three parties had also clarified that the standard
will be interpreted in an evolutionary manner.7' The Tribunal's main task was, under these
special circumstances, to give substance to the contemporary meaning of "fair and equitable
treatment" as opposed to an understanding as it was accepted decades ago.72 One key issue
in this context was the relevance of modern investment treaties. The NAFTA parties them-
selves had taken a position which could be understood to indicate that the content of BITs
had not, or not yet, become identical with the rules of general international law."
Nevertheless, the Tribunal concluded in view to the widespread BIT practice, that such
a body of concordant practice will necessarily have influenced the content of rules governing
the treatment of foreign investment in current international law. It would be surprising if
this practice and the vast number of provisions it reflects were to be interpreted as meaning
no more than the Neer Tribunal (in a very different context) meant in 1927.74
Thus, the Tribunal did not, at least explicitly, take the position that customary law had
become identical with treaty law, but that the concordant practice would have "influenced"
the relevant rules of customary law. The Tribunal did not elaborate on the precise extent
of this influence, nor did it address the circumstances under which practice governed by a
treaty will be considered as practice relevant for customary law.
The Tribunal in UPS v. Canada confirmed that the standard is "included within the
minimum standard," but had no reason to elaborate.
7
1
ADF Group Inc., dated January 9, 2003,76 builds upon the Mondev decision, literally citing
two of the key passages from Mondev.77 Nevertheless, it would not be correct to assume
that the ADF ruling is identical with the reasoning in Mondev. More precisely, the two
citations of Mondev in ADF, when read together, may be interpreted to contain a degree of
70. Mondev Int'l Ltd. v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2 (Oct. 11, 2002), 42 I.L.M. 85, 106
(Stephen, Crawford, Schwebel, Arbs.).
71. Id. at para. 124.
72. For an evolutionary interpretation of the notion of "sacred trust" as used in 1919 in the light of the UN
Charter adopted in 1945, see Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in
Namibia (SW. Africa) Nothwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276, 1971 I.Cj. 16 (June 21).
73. See Mondev, 42 I.L.M. 85, at para. 110: "In their post-hearing submissions, all three NAFTA Parties
challenged holdings of the Tribunal in Pope & Talbot which find that the content of contemporary international
law reflects the concordant provisions of many hundreds of bilateral investment treaties. In particular, attention
was drawn to what those three States saw as a failure of the Pope & Talbot Tribunal to consider a necessary
element of the establishment of a rule of customary international law, namely opiniojuris. These States appear
to question whether the parties to the very large numbers of bilateral investment treaties have acted out of a
sense of legal obligation when they include provisions in those treaties such as that for "fair and equitable"
treatment of foreign investment."
74. Id. at para. 117.
75. U.PS. v. Canada (Nov. 22, 2004) (Keith, Cass, Fortier, Arbs.) (Award on Jurisdiction), available at
www.asil.org/ilib/ilibO6O2.htm#j3 (last visited Apr. 5, 2005).
76. ADF Group, Inc. v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/1, 18 ICSID REv. 195, 279 (Jan. 9,
2003) (Feliciano, de Mestral, Lamm, Arbs.).
77. See id., paras. 183 and 184.
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ambiguity when it comes to identifying those elements which need to be considered in
determining the evolution of the law for the purpose of identifying the contemporary stan-
dard. Whereas iMondev seems to point to the relevance of bilateral treaties-".., such a
body of concordant practice will necessarily have influenced the content of rules governing
the treatment of foreign investment in current international law,"T 8-a subsequent para-
graph in Mondev seemingly approves the U.S. position that the minimum standard em-
bracing fair and equitable treatment will be determined by "as established in state practice
and in the jurisprudence of arbitral tribunals." 79
While it is not entirely clear whether "state practice" as understood in this sentence refers
to customary law or to the conclusion of bilateral treaties, as suggested by the language of
Mondev, the ADF ruling takes a clear position in a rather carefully worded interpretation
of Mondev: "We understand Mondev to be saying-and we would respectfully agree with
it-that any general requirement to accord 'fair and equitable treatment' and 'full protec-
tion and security' must be disciplined by being based upon State practice and judicial or
arbitral caselaw or other sources of customary or general international law. "o In other words,
treaty law was not included among the relevant sources for the identification of the con-
temporary standard. In the event, neither the Mondev nor the ADF Tribunal found a vio-
lation of the fair and equitable treatment standard.
Waste Management, dated April 30, 2004, dealt with the claim of a company "with weak-
ness of [an] original business plan [which] could not be overcome at a time of financial
stringency,"'s rejecting the claim under article 1105 of NAFTA.
As to the scope and interpretation of the Article, the Tribunal relied on the rulings of
the Mondev and ADF tribunals.82 The Tribunal also cited the S.D. Myers Case, decided
before the interpretation by the three NAFTA parties, which found that article 1105 is
violated ".... only when it is shown that an investor has been treated in such an unjust or
arbitrary manner that the treatment rises to the level that is unacceptable from the inter-
national perspective." 3 In a remarkable manner, the Tribunal establishes a close link be-
tween the requirement of fair and equitable treatment and the prohibition of denial of
justice. Without discussion of the identity or difference in the scope and meaning of the
requirements of the two standards, the Waste Management Tribunal blends the NAFTA
rulings on these two concepts and thus included the Mondev discussion on denial of justice
and the Loewen ruling on the same subject, even though the latter decision implied that a
distinction between the two standards would be appropriate. 84 Noting "certain differences
of emphasis" in the jurisprudence, the Tribunal concludes in Waste Management:
78. Mondev, 42 I.L.M. 85, at para. 117, quoted in ADF Group, 18 ICSID REv. at 183.
79. Mondev, 42 I.L.M. 85, at para. 119, quoted in ADF Group, 18 ICSID REv. at 184.
80. ADF Group, 18 ICSID REv. at 184 (emphasis added).
81. Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/00/3 (Apr. 30,2004),43 I.L.M.
967 (2004), at para 113 (Crawford, Civiletti, Gomez, Arbs.), available at www.state.gov/documents/organization/
34643.pdf.
82. Id. at paras. 91-93.
83. Id., quoting S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada (Oct. 21, 2002) (Second Partial Award) (Hunter, Chiasson,
Schwartz, Arbs.), at para. 263, available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/SDMyersFinalAward.pdf(last
visited Apr. 16, 2005).
84. See Loewen v. United States (June 26, 2003) 42 I.L.M. 811 (2003) at para 137 (Mason, Mikva, Mustill,
Arbs.).
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Taken together, the S.D. Myers, Mondev, ADF and Loewen cases suggest that the minimum
standard of treatment of fair and equitable treatment is infringed by conduct attributable to
the State and harmful to the claimant if the conduct is arbitrary, grossly unfair, unjust or
idiosyncratic, is discriminatory and exposes the claimant to sectional or racial prejudice, or
involves a lack of due process leading to an outcome which offends judicial propriety-as might
be the case with a manifest failure of natural justice in judicial proceedings or a complete lack
of transparency and candour in an administrative process. In applying this standard it is relevant
that the treatment is in breach of representations made by the host State which were reasonably
relied on by the claimant. 5
Consistent with the approach in Mondev and ADF, the Tribunal thus based its decision
on previous arbitral rulings.
V. The State of the Law at the Time of the Investment: The
Basis and Limits of Legitimate Reliance
One element which is central to the understanding of the modem notion of fair and
equitable treatment concerns the specific importance of that state of the law of the host
state which was in force at the time at which the foreigner acquired his investment.
86 Recent
jurisprudence has highlighted and accentuated the significance of this contextual dimension
of the principle. The point is made in the most straightforward and succinct manner in the
NAFTA case GAIMI v. Mexico of November 15, 2004 (Reisman, Lacarte Mur6, Paulsson):
"To repeat: NAFTA arbitrations have no mandate to evaluate laws and regulations that
predate the decision of a foreign investor to invest.""7
In S.D. Myers v. Canada, also a NAFTA case, the Tribunal had to rule on a specific
provision of Canadian law regulating exports into the United States.8 The decision essen-
tially makes the same point as the GAMI Tribunal: "[t]he Tribunal makes no determination
on this issue because in this case the Disputing Parties acted on the basis of the law as it
then appeared to exist." 9
In a similar way, Marvin Feldman v. Mexico,9° addressing the significance of a Mexican
scheme concerning an invoice requirement in the context of duties on certain export trans-
actions (called IEPS law) ruled as follows: "Since the operation of its export business de-
pended substantially on the terms of the IEPS law, the Claimant was or should have been
aware at all relevant times that the separate invoice requirement existed, as there has been
no dejure change in it at any time relevant to this dispute."'
85. Waste Management, 43 I.L.M. 967 at para. 98.
86. The law of the host state can also be of crucial importance in the definition of an investment. See Mihalyi
v. Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/2 (Mar. 15, 2002), 41 ILM 867 (2002) (Sucharitkul, Rogers, Suratgar,
Arbs.).
87. GAMI Investments, Inc. v. United Mexican Status (Nov. 15 2004), at para. 93, available at ita.law.uvic.ca/
documents/Gami.pdf (last visited Apr. 5, 2005).
88. S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada (Oct. 21, 2002) (Second Partial Award) (Hunter, Chiasson, Schwartz, Arbs.),
available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/SDMyersFinalAward.pdf (last visited Apr. 16, 2005).
89. GAMI Investments at para. 191.
90. Feldman v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)99/1 (Dec. 16, 2002), 42 ILM 625 (2003)
(Kerameus, Covarrubias Bravo, Gantz, Arbs.).
91. Id. at para 128.
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Thus, the Tribunal also clarified that proof of positive knowledge was not required and
that the rule applied if the investor had the opportunity to take cognizance of the law. An
unpublished law unknown to the investor would not have had the same significance.
The Mondev decision also contains language which may be understood to confirm the
same principle. 92 Dealing with a US court decision applying a rule of statutory immunity
to the Boston Redevelopment Agency (BRA), the Arbitral Tribunal ruled:
It is not disputed by the Claimant that this decision was in accordance with Massachusetts law,
and it did not involve on its face anything arbitrary or discriminatory or unjust, i.e., any new
act which might be characterised as in itself a breach of article 1105(1). In other words, if it
was not in December 1993 a breach of NAFTA for BRA to enjoy immunity from suit for
tortious interference (and, because NAFTA was not then in force, it could not have been such
a breach), it is far from clear how the (ex hypothesi correct) decision of the United States courts
as to the scope of that immunity, after 1 January 1994, could have been in itself unfair or
inequitable. On this ground alone, it may well be that Mondev's article 1105(1) claim was
bound to fail.... ."
The first NAFTA Case, Azinian v. Mexico,94 may also be deemed relevant in this context
even though the claim in question concerned the expropriation clause and not fair and
equitable treatment. The relevant issue was the annulation of a concession contract by the
competent Mexican authority as confirmed by Mexican courts. The claimant (DESONA)
based its claim on this concession contract while Mexico argued that the contract was
invalid. The Tribunal accepted the Mexican position with this reasoning:
95. The logical starting point is to examine the asserted original invalidity of the Concession
Contract. If this assertion was founded, there is no need to make findings with respect to
performance; nor can there be a question of curing original invalidity.
96. From this perspective, the problem may be put quite simply. The Ayuntamiento believed
it had grounds for holding the Concession Contract to be invalid under Mexican law governing
public service concessions. At DESONA's initiative, these grounds were tested by three levels
of Mexican courts, and in each case were found to be extant. How can it be said that Mexico
breached NAFTA when the Ayuntamiento of Naucalpan purported to declare the invalidity
of a Concession Contract which by its terms was subject to Mexican law, and to the jurisdiction
of the Mexican courts, and the courts of Mexico then agreed with the Ayuntamiento's deter-
mination? Further, the Claimants have neither contended nor proved that the Mexican legal
standards for the annulment of concessions violate Mexico's Chapter Eleven obligations; nor
that the Mexican law governing such annulments is expropriatory.
97. With the question thus framed, it becomes evident that for the Claimants to prevail it is
not enough that the Arbitral Tribunal disagree with the determination of the Ayuntamiento.
A governmental authority surely cannot be faulted for acting in a manner validated by its courts
unless the courts themselves are disavowed at the international evel."5
Thus, the Tribunal in Azinian not just confirmed the same viewpoint as the GAMI and
Feldman decisions, it also extended the ruling beyond the law as written to its application
92. Mondev Int'l Ltd. v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2 (Oct. 11, 2002), 42 I.L.M. 85, at
para. 156 (Stephen, Crawford, Schwebel, Arbs.).
93. Id. (foomote omitted).
94. Azinian v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/97/2 (Nov. 1, 1999), 39 ILM 537 (2000)
(Paulsson, Civileti, von Wobeser, Arbs.).
95. Id. at paras. 95-97.
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and interpretation by the domestic courts of the host country, concluding that the foreign
investor had to accept the law as it was applied by the competent national courts. The only
limitations recognized by the Tribunal concerned a violation of NAFTA by the law, and
(more properly: including) expropriatory acts. 96 The Tribunal apparently had no reason to
examine whether the understanding and application of the law came as a surprise and had
no basis in previous rulings.
It bears emphasis that this line of jurisprudence with its focus on the law of the host state
at the time of the investment is by no means novel. The Permanent Court of International
Justice had to rule in the Chinn case whether Mr. Oscar Chinn, a British subject, was entitled
to a claim against the Belgian Government, at that time the colonial power of the Belgian
Congo, in view of a market distortion caused by Belgium when it favoured and supported
Unatra, the only market rival of Mr. Chinn. 97 The Court rejected the claim and explained
that Chinn should have been aware of the legal peculiarities of the market which existed
when he made his investment:
(...) Mr. Chinn, a British subject, when, in 1929, he entered the river transport business, could
not have been ignorant of the existence of the competition which he would encounter on the
part of Unatra, which had been established since 1925, of the magnitude of the capital invested
in that Company, of the connection it had with the Colonial and Belgian Governments, and
of the predominant role reserved to the latter with regard to the fixing and application of
transport rates.9s
Thus, the Court focused not just on the law as written, but also on the law as a basis for
its subsequent application detrimental to the investor. The Court voted six to five on this
point, and it was questioned, inter alia, whether the ruling was consistent with an applicable
treaty requiring "commercial equality" for foreign subjects such as Mr. Chinn. Whatever
may have been the proper construction of the treaty containing this requirement, the basic
conceptual approach of the Chinn ruling reflected the position that a foreign investor must
accept the law as it stands at the time of the investment and cannot subsequently base a
claim on the application of that law.
The various rulings of the Courts and Tribunals discussed above have not addressed the
doctrinal foundation of the reasoning which they applied. Essentially, this aspect will not
be seen to raise a serious question. The principle of territorial sovereignty and of economic
self-determination provide for the doctrinal basis of the jurisprudence here reviewed. Each
state has always had the right to determine its own laws, within the boundaries of the
international minimum standard and of ins cogens, and this legal position has not been
abandoned in the process of economic and legal globalization. Correspondingly, no other
state and no foreign investor can be considered, in the absence of a treaty to the contrary,
to have a right toward a host state to determine and organize its law in any particular
manner, and the logical extension of this principle is that no investor has a right to base a
claim against the host country upon the subsequent application of the law to the business
of the investor.
96. The Tribunal could (or should) have simply referred to NAFTA and all laws embodied in the interna-
tional minimum standard governing the status of aliens.
97. Oscar Chinn Case (U.K. v. Beg.), 1934 P.C.Ij. (ser. A./B) No. 63 (Dec. 12), availableatwww.icj-cij.org/
cijwww/cdecisions/ccpij/serieAB/AB_63/O1 -Oscar- ChinnArret.pdf.
98. Id. at 84.
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The foregoing observations have focused on the pre-investment state of the law as a
limitation for the range of elements which serve to determine the standard of protection
to be accorded to the investor under the standard of fair and equitable treatment. However,
that state of the law is of equal significance for establishing the framework of those consid-
erations which in a positive sense will decide the protection granted to the investor. That
the pre-investment state of the law forms the foundation of this protection, and its limits,
also clarifies that the standard of fair and equitable treatment is in this respect relative in
its nature, depending upon the law as it happens to stand at one particular time. A part of
the difficulty to define and prescribe the standard of fair and equitable treatment in absolute
terms finds its explanation in this context.
From the viewpoint of the investor, this chronological anchoring of the operation of the
standard in effect serves as reminder to carefully examine the law as it stands before the
investment and to consider the implications of content and its peculiarities. From the van-
tage point of the host state, this setting requires that the government must at all times be
aware that the law as it stands and as it is reformed will in the future allow the foreign
investor to point to this date and to this legal order as the legal basis for his decision.
The double function of the pre-investment state of the law as both the foundation of the
investment decision and the limitation of his subsequent protection in case of a dispute
reveals that in this respect the standard of fair and equitable treatment is closely tied to
considerations underlying the notion of legitimate expectations which has occasionally been
referred to by international tribunals in cases brought by foreign investors. The pre-
investment legal order forms the framework for the positive reach of the expectation which
will be protected and also the scope of considerations upon which the host state is entitled
to rely when it defends against subsequent claims of the foreign investor. Here, it becomes
clear that the standard of fair and equitable treatment centers to a considerable degree, on
expectations of the foreign investor and that in the individual case the legitimacy of these
expectations will largely depend upon the objective state of the law as it stands at the time
when the investor acquires the investment.
The foregoing analysis is responsive to the mutual interests of both the host state and
the foreign investor upon which the entire scheme of economics and law of foreign in-
vestment is predicated. Whereas the law protects expectations of the foreign investor, it
does so only to the extent that these expectations are grounded in the legal order of the
host state as determined by the host state in accordance with the principles of territorial
sovereignty and economic self-determination.
A second dimension covered by the requirements of fair and equitable treatment also
concerns the investor's ability of planning and doing business, in regard to the conduct of
the host state subsequent to the investment. Consistency in the course of actions of the
host state concerns the investor in all areas of regulations, from the process of requiring
and granting of permits to regulations of health and environment and the imposition of
taxes, royalties and duties. The issue may arise simply upon the reversal of conduct by one
organ. Alternatively, simultaneous inconsistent conduct on the part of two organs with
respect to the same subject matter such as a permit requirement may also be relevant. Again,
the focus here is on the legitimate expectations of the investor, but not in regard to the
pre-investment state of the law, but at a later stage. One of the main areas of application
of this consideration will be discretionary rules and areas of governmental decision-making
for which the investor has no right to a specific action on the part of the government. The
basic concern again is not to tie the host government to any specific standard, but to allow
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the foreign investor to rely on a standard which the government has freely determined. In
specific circumstances, the scope and meaning of these considerations may become espe-
cially complex when an evolutionary understanding of the law or the policy is explicitly or
implicitly built into the law.
Underlying all of these applications of fair and equitable treatment are the basic themes
of stability of the law and, seen from the investor's perspective, predictability of the re-
quirements to be met and the rights to be granted. In the words of the TECMED tribunal,
the thrust of the concern is the foreign investor's ability "to know beforehand." 99 Obviously,
this concern is not so important for those types of transactions which bring the two parties
together for only a short period of a few months. The issue acquires a totally different
dimension for the long-term investor who has sunk his money into a project and has cal-
culated his expected rate of return for a period of thirty years or more, especially when the
initial investment costs are high, the post-investment costs are low and the return on the
investment depends upon permits or, in a regulated sector, rate-setting decisions of the host
state. Such long-term foreign investments, as they are not infrequent in the energy sector,
in the water sector or in waste management, will be made by the prudent investor only
upon due diligence and the judgment that the political risks stemming from a potential
future change of action on the part of the host state will not likely stand in the way of
preventing the reasonable implementation of the business plan. The standard of fair and
equitable treatment will acquire its strongest significance in such long-term projects.
VI. Reliance On Contractual Arrangements and On
Assurances
One of the most difficult issues concerning the reach of the standard of fair and equitable
treatment pertains to the matter of legitimate reliance on the part of the investor in regard
to contractual relations with the host state. D. Carreau and P. Juillard base their under-
standing of the standard on the need for a satisfactory balance of the interests of the investor,
the host state and the home state. l00 So far, this problem is far from resolved. On the one
hand, it is clear that contractual relations may form the framework on which the foreign
investor has relied after it was negotiated and tailor-made to the needs of the specific in-
vestment, possibly quite distinct from the general regulatory framework of the host country.
This nature of a contract as a kind of lex specialis accepted by the host state so as to attract
and accommodate the foreign investor may be considered to justify special protection of
the affected investor, more so than the expectation of the investor who has decided to
operate under the host state's general legislation. From the opposite perspective, it may be
argued that contractual arrangements deserve less protection precisely because they deviate
from general legislation which may be seen to reflect the public good more broadly than
an individual contract. Recent ICSID jurisprudence regarding indirect takings may be in-
terpreted to weigh towards this second line of thinking. The 2004 Waste Management de-
cision does not consider all serious breaches of a contract to amount to an expropriation
while it is generally assumed that a serious breach of a traditional property right will require
99. Tecnicas Medioambientales TECMED S.A. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case ARB (AF)/00/2 (May
29, 2003), 43 ILM 133 (2004), at para. 154.
100. DOMINIQUE CARREAU & PATRICK JUILLARD, DROIT INTERNATIONAL EcoNoM1QuE 437 (2003).
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compensation. The Waste Management ruling has relied on the distinction between gov-
ernmental and commercial acts by state organs in this context, and it remains to be seen
whether this approach will find general acceptance and ultimately contribute to a line of
jurisprudence which reduces the practical value of contractual arrangements from the point
of view of the investor and correspondingly broadens the scope of non-compensable actions
of the government in relation to contracts.
A related issue concerns the comparison between the effect of a stabilization clause, of
an umbrella clause and of the requirements of fair and equitable treatment in the context
of an investment contract. Strict insistence on the concept of reliance for a contractual
arrangement would come close to having the same effect as a stabilization clause or an
umbrella clause. The issue does not become more simple when it is recognized that neither
the legal significance of a stabilization nor the meaning of an umbrella clause has been
clarified by recent decisions, and the entire issue must be deemed to remain open at this
point.
Also, the legal significance of assurances given to foreign investors in a non-formalized
context such as public speeches by representatives of the host country remains to be clarified
by international tribunals. On the state-to-state-level, international courts have clearly decided
that under certain conditions unilateral statements may create international obligations.101
VII. Conclusion
State parties to investment treaties have entrusted arbitral tribunals with a formidable
task when they included the standard in the BITs in the expectation that tribunals will
identify an investment-specific, judicially manageable content of the clause. The task was
even more demanding as the standard had to be developed ab novo in the absence of any
rule or precedent in any other field of international law. The current ICSID system of ad
hoc tribunals and the corresponding lack of institutionalized continuity and consistency of
jurisprudence have added to the challenge of developing a body of jurisprudence tailored
to the specific structures of foreign investment and acceptable to investors, the host state
and the home state.
Meeting the investor's central legitimate concern of legal consistency, stability and pre-
dictability remains a major, but not the only, ingredient of an investment-friendly climate
in which the host state in turn can reasonably expect to attract foreign investment. Thus,
no inconsistency between the interests of the host state and those of the investor in regard
to the creation of a stable legal framework of the host state will be diagnosed. Built upon
this joint perspective of host state and investor, underlying the agreement on an investment
treaty, the standard of fair and equitable treatment will nevertheless not be understood to
amount to a stabilization clause but will leave a measure of governmental space for regu-
lation. Presumably, the degree of freedom generally considered as appropriate in domestic
legal orders will not be affected. It is true that in effect the standard will narrow down the
discretionary space available to the host state. But it is also true, in principle, that this
specific sort of limitation is indeed necessary to attract foreign investment.
101. See, e.g., Nuclear Tests (Aust. v. Fra.), 1974 I.CJ. 253, 267 (Dec. 20); Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fra.),
1974 I.CJ. 457, 472 (Dec. 20); Eastern Greenland (Den. v. Nor.), 1933 P.C.I.J. (set A/B) No. 53, 70. In the
investment context, see, e.g., Revere Copper v. OPIC (Aug. 24, 1978), 17 I.L.M. 1321. (The ruling does not
make clear what type of assurances are meant. Reference is made to the "Heads of Agreement" on page 262).
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Within this general setting, investment tribunals have, in the past five years, started to
develop a framework of understanding which is responsive to the basic rationale of the
clause and is suitable for judicial management. Two overlapping central lines of application
have emerged. The first one concerns consistency of governmental action. This will be of
practical importance, for instance, in such areas in which the domestic law of the host state
lacks substantive or jurisdictional clarity, or grants discretionary power to the local author-
ities. Changes of government may lead to special problems in this context as well as in the
second area of concern, being the stability of long-term arrangements and commitments,
which may be re-evaluated by governments following the one which accepted the obligation
toward the investor.
The most important contribution to an operational understanding of the standard for
this latter issue concerns the strict focus on the state of the law at the time of investment,
laying the basis and limiting the legitimate expectations protected by the standard. This
central component of the case-law as developed in the past years embodies and reflects the
two pillars of foreign investment law, being the respect for the host state's rights of eco-
nomic sovereignty and the protection of the investor's legitimate expectations. The focus
on the law at the time of investment provides, in principle, for an appropriate synthesis of
these two principles.
The issue of defining the necessary governmental space to change a law is not resolved
by this approach, but a framework of analysis is thereby established. Special factors relevant
in a special case have to be identified and accommodated, and in this respect it is true that
the first phase of jurisprudence may not have led to much clarity as to the nature of these
factors and the weight to be accorded to them. Ultimately, however, it should not be ex-
pected that criteria and formula can be developed which would allow an application of a
standard in the manner of a hard and fast rule. The nature of the standard simply will not
allow an understanding which would satisfy a demand for total predictability in the sense
of the removal of all individualized aspects of weighing relevant concerns by the competent
tribunal. Within these parameters, the first generation of judgments giving content to the
clause may well be considered to provide an appropriate measure of guidance for future cases.
As indicated, a major issue that will have to be developed by further jurisprudence con-
cerns the relationship of the standard to other clauses of an investment treaty or an in-
vestment contract, in particular to the rules on indirect expropriation and the umbrella
clause of a treaty. Will the standard serve as a catch-all safety clause for the foreign investor
which operates in the same areas of applications as other clauses in investment treaties
addressing all insufficiencies, real or perceived, of actions of the host state below the thresh-
old of other clauses, or will the standard operate primarily in areas of application not gen-
erally covered by such other standards? In other words, will the standard have a supple-
mentary or a corrective function in relation to other principles? Will the standard be applied
with a bias to the interest of the host state or of the investor? And will the standard be
applied with a significant degree of deference to the host state or will an autonomous standard
of application be rigorously applied by the tribunal? The questions indicate that serious issues
remain in the understanding and application of the standard for a second generation of judg-
ments. If they will be as consistent and principle-oriented as the first one, the standard can
be said to have served the purpose for which it was intended by the state parties.
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